The number of deaths from all causes in Sweden between March 1 and August 25 was 46 746, an excess mortality rate of 11% compared with the average death rate of 41 9-2019 (Figure 3). These represented 0.8%, 0.03% and 0.06% of the total population, respectively (Figure 2). 3 RESULTS 3.1 COVID-19 in Swedenīy September 2020, 84 521 Sweden residents had tested positive for the virus, 2560 had been admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) and 5813 had died. The study period was the eight months ending September 1, 2020. National government agencies were contacted by email in July to August 2020, and web pages and reports were examined.
Less attention is paid to actions that primarily sustained the economy. This paper covers the eight-month period up to September 1 and presents a detailed timeline on how Sweden flattened the curve, protected elderly and risk groups and ensured that health and medical care resources were available in all regions.
They also include actions taken with regard to schools. These differences include the timing of pandemic-related actions, the way that COVID-19 has been coded in medical records, how different parts of the healthcare system reacted to the pandemic and the legal framework covering the relationship between the Government and other actors. Data sources: NBHW, PHA and the Department of EducationĮarlier reviews on Sweden's pandemic response have been published, 1 but there have been little data on what has set Sweden apart from other countries. ICU, intensive care unit NBHW, Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare PHA, Swedish Public Health Agency. Timeline of the Swedish COVID-19 strategy (parts 1 and 2). The actions taken in Sweden in the eight months up to September 1, and the key actors who were involved, can be seen in the detailed timeline that accompanies this paper (Figure 1). Since then, many countries have taken extensive steps to restrict transmission, but Sweden adopted a more measured approach, without the national lockdowns instigated by many of its European neighbours. The World Health Organization (WHO) classified COVID-19 as a threat to human health on January 30, 2020, and upgraded it to a pandemic on March 11. Physical distancing was strongly recommended, and mandatory in some situations, but facemasks were not recommended outside health care.This review of the timeline and key actors shows that schools for children up to 16 were kept open, but older children studied at home.Sweden's response to COVID-19 was less invasive than many other countries during the first eight months, with no general lockdown and a focus on slowing, not stopping, the pandemic.
This paper examines the first eight months. Sweden chose a different pandemic strategy to its peer nations. There were no enforced quarantines for infected households or geographical regions, and facemasks were not recommended outside health care. Kindergartens and schools for children up to 16 stayed open, but closed for older children for three months. Visits to nursing facilities were banned. Physical distancing was recommended in public spaces, but mandatory in bars, restaurants and at events. It focused on mitigation: slowing, but not stopping, the pandemic. Sweden's response was less invasive than many other countries, with no general lockdown. County councils and regions implemented policies, in conjunction with the Department of Education and county administrative boards. The main actors were the Public Health Agency, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Civil Contingencies Agency and the Government. Resultsīy September 1, 2020, 0.8% of Swedish residents had tested positive for the virus and 0.06% of the population had died, which was higher than neighbouring Nordic countries, but lower than some European countries with general lockdowns. MethodsĪ narrative review was carried out and a timeline constructed. This paper reviews the Swedish pandemic response. COVID-19 has affected millions of people worldwide.
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